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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KIRK DUDLEY, 
Defendant/Appellant 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
SALVATORE CALCATERRA, 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendants Kirk Dudley and Salvatore Calcaterra appeal their 
respective convictions for attempted possession of a controlled 
substance (cocaine), a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), -(2)(b)(ii) and -(7) (Supp. 
1992) and possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) and -(2)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1992) pursuant to a plea bargain 
in the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Washington County, 
Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(f) (1992). 
Case No. 920255-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was the trial court correct in denying defendants' motion 
to suppress marijuana found in defendants' car where an officer 
stopped defendants for speeding on the highway and, in the course 
of issuing a traffic citation, smelled the odor of burnt marijuana 
emanating from the vehicle and then searched the car, finding 
marijuana in the passenger compartment? 
"In absence of clear error, the trial court's findings of fact 
underlying its decision to grant or deny the suppression motion 
must be upheld." State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 
1991) (citing State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 649 (Utah 1989)). The 
legal conclusions that the trial court draws from those findings, 
however, will be reviewed under a correction of error standard. 
Steward, 806 P.2d at 215 (citing State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 
327 (Utah App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 
1991)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on appeal 
is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After a hearing in which the court denied defendants' motion 
to suppress, defendants entered into plea bargains pursuant to 
State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). Salvatore Calcaterra 
was thereafter convicted of possession of a controlled substance, 
cocaine (Calcaterra R. at 80, 100-02), and Kirk Dudley was 
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convicted of attempted possession of a controlled substance, also 
cocaine (Dudley R. at 53, 71-73). The court stayed the execution 
of a prison sentence and fine and placed Calcaterra on 36 months 
probation, on condition that he serve 30 days in jail and pay a 
fine of $1150 (Calcaterra R. at 100-02). The court also stayed the 
execution of Dudley's sentence and fine and placed him on 36 months 
probation on condition that he serve 15 days in jail and pay a fine 
of $775 (Dudley R. at 71-73). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The findings of the trial court arising from the suppression 
hearing on April 24, 1991, are not contested and are presented 
below in their entirety (R. 39-42). Citations to the transcript 
have been added. 
1. That on December 9, 1990, the Defendant, 
Salvatore Calcaterra was driving his vehicle, 
and Defendant Kirk Dudley was a passenger, 
northbound on 1-15 about five miles from the 
Utah border (T. 7-8). 
2. Utah Highway Patrol Trooper James Lloyd 
stopped the vehicle at about mile post six, 
after determining the Calcaterra vehicle was 
traveling about 78 miles an hour in a zone 
where that was excessive speed (T. 7). 
3. That Trooper Lloyd issued a citation to 
Mr. Calcaterra for the speeding violation (T. 
11). 
4. That during the process of the filling out 
of the citation in his vehicle, Trooper Lloyd 
requested information from EPIC — El Paso 
Information Center — for the reason that he 
had sine lied marijuana in the vehicle as he was 
speaking to the driver at the side of the 
vehicle prior to the issuance of the citation 
(T. 47). 
5. That the officer did detect the odors of 
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marijuana (T. 9, 12-13, 31). 
6. The officer went back to the vehicle, 
issued the citation to Mr. Calcaterra, handed 
him the citation and his driver's license (T. 
11/ 44). 
7. That it was a normal traffic violation, 
with the addition of an odor of marijuana. 
8. That the officer asked Mr. Calcaterra 
whether or not he had drugs, weapons or 
alcohol in the vehicle (T. 13, 40, 44). 
9. Mr. Calcaterra replied that he did not (T. 
13, 40). 
10. The officer asked if he could search the 
trunk of the vehicle (T. 13). 
11. Mr. Calcaterra replied that he was not 
carrying anything (T. 13, 49). 
12. The officer asked again if he could 
search the trunk of the vehicle (T. 13). 
13. Mr. Calcaterra then alighted and went 
around and opened the trunk of the vehicle and 
allowed the officer to search (T. 13, 49). 
14. While he was engaged in the search of the 
trunk, the officer received a response from 
the dispatcher in Cedar City to his inquiry of 
EPIC, indicating that Mr. Calcaterra had a 
previous history of involvement in drugs [sic] 
offenses (T. 14, 41). 
15o The officer returned to the vehicle and 
continued the search of the trunk and found 
nothing of note in the trunk. 
16. The officer asked Mr. Calcaterra about 
the information that he'd received from the 
dispatcher relating to an alleged conviction 
involving the transportation of drugs (T.16). 
17. Mr. Calcaterra explained to the officer 
as he understood it, that he had been 
arrested, but the charges had been dismissed 
(T. 16). 
18. The officer then asked if he could search 
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the interior of the vehicle (T. 17). 
19. Mr. Calcaterra indicated that he was not 
carrying any of the things that the officer 
was looking for (T. 17). 
20. The officer then inquired a second time 
whether he could search the interior of the 
vehicle by saying, "May I search the interior 
of the vehicle, then?" (T. 17). 
21. Mr. Calcaterra shrugged his shoulders, 
with a motion which the officer indicated on 
the witness stand (T. 17, 42). 
22. The officer took that to be consent and 
proceeded to search the vehicle (T. 18). 
23. Mr. Calcaterra did not object to the 
search of the vehicle at that time, nor did 
the passenger of the vehicle. 
24. The officer, in searching the vehicle, 
determined that there was a small quantity of 
marijuana and what appeared to be a marijuana 
pipe hidden in a plastic receptacle on the 
console portion of the vehicle (T. 21). 
25. When Mr. Calcaterra determined that the 
drug had been found, he approached the officer 
and asked for a break (T. 24). 
26. The officer then handcuffed Mr. 
Calcaterra and placed him under arrest (T. 
23). 
27. Mr. Dudley was likewise arrested and 
handcuffed when the second officer arrived. 
28. The officers then proceeded to complete 
the search of the vehicle and discovered other 
items of contraband while the defendants were 
standing by handcuffed and under arrest (T. 
25). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
After lawfully stopping a vehicle for a traffic offense, the 
police officer issuing the traffic citation smelled the odor of 
burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle he had stopped. Under the 
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federal "plain smell" correlary to the warrant requirement's plain 
view exception, the smell of marijuana provided the officer with 
probable cause to search the vehicle. Defendants' argument that 
the detention became unlawful once the traffic citation was issued 
because the reasonable suspicion necessary to continue the 
detention did not exist is without merit in light of the officer's 
detection of the burnt marijauna odor. 
Defendants' focus on whether defendant Calcaterra voluntarily 
consented to the search is misplaced; consent is not a component of 
the plain view (or here, the "plain smell") exception to the 
warrant requirement. The issue of consent need not be reached in 
order to uphold the lawfulness of the vehicle search. The trial 
court's denial of defendants' motion to supress, therefore, should 
be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SCOPE OF DEFENDANTS' DETENTION FOLLOWING 
THE ISSUANCE OF THE TRAFFIC CITATION WAS 
LAWFUL BECAUSE THE OFFICER SMELLED MARIJUANA 
IN THE VEHICLE, WHICH CONSTITUTED NOT ONLY 
REASONABLE SUSPICION TO FURTHER DETAIN 
DEFENDANTS, BUT PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THEIR 
VEHICLE AS WELL. 
Defendants assert on appeal that the scope of their detention 
was unlawful under both the United States Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution. However, they have failed to develop any meaningful 
argument under the Utah Constitution, either at the trial court or 
on appeal. Mere nominal allusion to a state constitutional claim, 
unsupported by meaningful analysis, will not suffice to permit 
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appellate review. State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d at 327-28; State v. 
Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272-73 & n.5 (Utah App. 1990). In such a 
situation, the matter is waived.1 Analysis, therefore, must 
proceed under the federal constitution.2 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated . . •." 
As this provision applies to encounters between police and 
citizens, the Utah Supreme Court has identified three 
constitutionally acceptable levels of police stops: 
"(1) [AJn officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that 
the person has committed or is about to commit 
a crime; however, the 'detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary 
to effectuate the purpose of the stop;' (3) an 
officer may arrest a suspect if the officer 
has probable cause to believe an offense had 
been committed or is being committed." 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (quoting United 
States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied. 
1
 Nor have defendants argued "plain error" or "exceptional 
circumstances" that might afford them relief from the appellate 
waiver normally resulting from the failure to develop the 
constitutional argument below. See State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 
920, 920-26 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 
(Utah App. 1990). 
2
 This Court has noted that the standard required by the Utah 
Constitution, however, may well be different from that required by 
the United States Constitution. See State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 
969, 973 n.7 (Utah App. 1992). 
7 
476 U.S. 1142 (1986)). In the context of traffic stops, "when an 
officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation, he may briefly 
detain the vehicle and its occupants while he examines the vehicle 
registration and the driver's license." State v. Schlosser, 774 P. 
2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 
(1979)). And, when an officer makes such a stop, "[t]he length and 
scope of the detention must be "'strictly tied to and justified by' 
the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968). 
In this case, it is undisputed that the initial traffic stop 
was a valid one, falling within the second level articulated by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Deitman, based on uncontroverted evidence 
that defendant was travelling well in excess of the speed limit. 
The officer was standing next to the driver's side window, where he 
had a lawful right to be, and was obtaining the driver's license 
and registration, when he smelled "an intermittent odor of what 
smelled like marijuana" as well as "a strong perfume odor" (T. 9). 
He returned to his police car, ran a warrants check, and returned 
to defendants' car to issue the citation to the driver. At this 
point, he again smelled marijuana. 
When the driver accepted the citation, the purpose of the 
original detention was fulfilled, just as defendants assert. 
Defendants, however, would end the analysis at this point, 
asserting that once the citation was issued, the detention became 
unlawful. They would ignore the court's uncontroverted factual 
finding that the officer smelled burnt marijuana emanating from the 
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vehicle and would instead baldly state that, in continuing the 
detention, "[t]he officer was acting on a hunch based on a profile" 
(Defendant's Br, 13). There is simply no record support for 
defendants' claim. 
Defendants cite a potpourri of Utah cases but fail to apply 
the law of those cases to the facts of the instant case. As but 
one example, defendants discuss at length State v. Robinson, 797 
P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990), a case in which officers validly stopped 
a vehicle on the highway for a traffic violation, ran a warrants 
check that produced nothing of note, issued a citation, and then 
continued to detain the vehicle without any reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity. Eventually, they searched the car and 
discovered marijuana. The Court held that the circumstances 
confronting the officers, including the driver's nervousness, 
defendants' inability to produce a written authorization to drive 
the allegedly borrowed car, an inability to contact the owner by 
phone, and a lack of any visible cold weather gear in the vehicle3 
were "insufficient to provide the officers with reasonable 
suspicion of car theft or other serious crime sufficient to justify 
the roadside detention and questioning that followed." State v. 
Robinson, 797 P. 2d at 436. Robinson, then, stands for the 
proposition that once the purposes of an initial lawful stop have 
been accomplished, an officer must have reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity to justify a continued detention and further 
3
 Defendants told the police they were on a two-week trip to 
the Wind Rivers to visit a friend and to fish. 
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questioning. JxL at 437. 
In this case, the distinctive odor of burnt marijuana provided 
the officer with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity/ The 
Robinson test is not only met, however; it is exceeded. The 
uncontroverted evidence of the marijuana odor emanating from the 
vehicle elevated the stop to a level three detention and provided 
the officer with probable cause to search the vehicle. See State 
v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 972-73 (Utah App. 1992); State v. 
Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231# 1236 (Utah App. 1989). 
POINT II 
THE OFFICERS' SEARCH OF DEFENDANTS' VEHICLE 
WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE ODOR OF MARIJUANA 
EMANATING FROM THE VEHICLE; UNDER FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CONSENT IS NOT A REQUIRED 
COMPONENT OF THE PLAIN VIEW EXCEPTION TO THE 
WARRANT REQUIREMENT. 
Defendants frame their argument on appeal in terms of consent, 
asserting either that defendant Calcaterra's shrug of his shoulders 
did not constitute unequivocal consent or that, if he did consent, 
he did not do so voluntarily because he was not free to leave. The 
trial court ruled on the issue, concluding that defendant consented 
* "Whether the requisite reasonable suspicion was present to 
support an investigatory detention by a police officer presents a 
question of fact." State v. Robinson', 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 
1990) (citing State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987)). A 
trial court's findings of fact will not be reversed unless "clearly 
erroneous." Id. (citations omitted). A finding is clearly 
erroneous if "it is 'against the clear weight of the evidence, or 
if the appellate court otherwise reaches a firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made.'" State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 
1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). 
But see State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13, 14-15 (Utah App. 1991), cert, 
denied, (Utah June 19, 1992) (reasonable suspicion treated as a 
conclusion of law). 
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to the search of the vehicle by shrugging his shoulders and not 
objecting to the search and that the consent was voluntary (See 
Addendum at 42-43). This Court, however, need not reach the issue 
of consent. It may affirm on any other proper alternative ground, 
even if that ground was not assigned by the trial court as the 
reason for its denial of defendant's motion to suppress. State v. 
Gallecros, 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985); State v. Droneburq, 781 
P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah App. 1989). 
Plainly, a warrantless vehicle search will be unreasonable per 
se unless it falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 
664, 671-72 (Utah App. 1991). The United States Supreme Court long 
ago established that a warrantless car search is permissible, 
however, if a police officer has probable cause to believe that the 
car contains contraband or criminal evidence that may be lost if 
not seized immediately. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 
151-52 (1925); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806-07 
(1982); State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085, 1087-88 (Utah 1986); State 
v. Leonard, 825 P.2d at 672. One exception to the warrant 
requirement, based on the rationale articulated in Carroll, 
includes objects within plain view. The requirements for this 
exception are that: 1) the officer is lawfully present at the 
location; 2) the evidence is in plain view; and 3) the evidence is 
clearly incriminating. State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 510 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
Within the plain view exception, courts have developed a 
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"plain smell" rule. The constitutional rationale for this rule is 
that the distinctive odor of marijuana constitutes a "plain smell" 
and, therefore, falls within the plain view exception described 
above. State v. Naisbitt. 827 P.2d at 972. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has 
stated: "This court has long recognized that marijuana has a 
distinct smell and that the odor of marijuana alone can satisfy the 
probable cause requirement to search a vehicle or baggage." United 
States v, Morin, 949 F.2d 297, 300 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing United 
States v, Merrvman, 630 F.2d 780, 785 (10th Cir. 1980)). The 
United States Supreme Court has also upheld the warrantless search 
of a vehicle's passenger compartment, when that search was based 
only on the odor of marijuana emanating from the car. Robbins v. 
California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981). This Court, applying the 
plain view test to plain smell, has stated that "objects in 'plain 
view'... may be seized without a warrant if the police officer is 
lawfully present and the evidence is clearly incriminating. This 
exception encompasses items within 'plain smell'." State v. 
Bartlev, 784 P.2d at 1235 (citations omitted); see also State v. 
Naisbitt, 827 P.2d at 972 (and cases cited therein). 
The facts of this case fall squarely within the purview of the 
plain smell rule. First, the legality of the initial traffic stop 
is undisputed. The officer was lawfully present by the driver's 
side of the vehicle, issuing a traffic citation for a speeding 
violation. Second, the trial court made a finding of fact that the 
officer smelled marijuana, and defendant has offered no evidence to 
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suggest that this finding is clearly erroneous. Finally, the smell 
of marijuana, a controlled substance, is clearly incriminating. 
The officer did not search the vehicle until after he detected the 
odor of burnt marijuana twice — once as he talked with the driver 
prior to issuing the citation and again as he handed the completed 
citation to the driver for his signature. Because the requirements 
of plain smell were fulfilled, the search was lawful. The trial 
court's denial of defendants' suppression motion was, therefore, 
correct and should be affirmed on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The odor of burnt marijuana emanating from defendants' car in 
the course of a lawful traffic stop provided probable cause for the 
officer to search the vehicle under the plain view exception to the 
warrant requirement. The trial court's denial of defendants' 
motion to suppress evidence seized in that search should, 
therefore, be upheld. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \H^ day of October, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
yWfaMML 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Randall Gaither, attorney for appellant, 321 South 600 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102, this _/f/^day of October, 1992. 
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ADDENDUM 
Paul F. Graf #1229 
Washington County Attorney 
O. Brenton Rowe #2815 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
178 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
(801) 634-5723 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
PLAINTIFF, ] 
VS. ] 
SALVATORE ANTHONY CALCATERRA, ] 
KIRK DUDLEY, ] 
DEFENDANT. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
| CRIMINAL NO. 911500026 
> CRIMINAL NO. 911500027 
The above-entitled matters having been consolidated for 
hearing on the Defendants for Motion to Suppress before the above-
entitled Court on the 24th day of April, 1991, and the State of 
Utah being represented by O. Brenton Rowe, Deputy Washington County 
Attorney, and Randall T\ Gaither, attorney for the Defendants being 
present, and the Defendants, Salvatore Anthony Calcaterra and Kirk 
Dudley, being present, and the Court having received testimony and 
exhibits in evidence, the Court having reviewed the files and 
records herein and being fully advised in the premises, now makes 
and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That on December 9, 1990, the Defendant, Salvatore 
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Calcaterra was driving his vehicle, and Defendant Kirk Dudley was a 
passenger, northbound on 1-15 about five miles from the Utah 
border, 
2. Utah Highway Patrol Trooper James Lloyd stopped the 
vehicle at about mile post six, after determining the Calcaterra 
vehicle was traveling about 78 miles an hour in a zone where that 
was excessive speed. 
3. That Trooper Lloyd issued a citation to Mr. calcaterra for 
the speeding violation. 
4. That during the process of the filling out of the citation 
in his vehicle, Trooper Lloyd requested information from EPIC — El 
Paso Information Center — for the reason that he had smelled 
marijuana in the vehicle as he was speaking to the driver at the 
side of the vehicle prior to the issuance of the citation. 
5. That the officer did detect the odors of marijuana. 
6. The officer went back to the vehicle, issued the citation 
to Mr. Calcaterra, handed him the citation and his driver's 
license. 
7. That it was a normal traffic violation, with the addition 
of an odor of marijuana. 
8. That the officer asked Mr. Calcaterra whether or not he 
had drugs, weapons or alcohol in the vehicle. 
9. Mr. Calcaterra replied that he did not. 
10. The officer asked if he could search the trunk of the 
vehicle. 
11. Mr. Calcaterra replied that he was not carrying anything. 
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12. The officer asked again if he could search the trunk of 
the vehicle. 
13. Mr. Calcaterra then alighted and went around and opened 
he trunk of the vehicle and allowed the officer to search. 
14. While he was engaged in the search of the trunk, the 
officer received a response from the dispatcher in Cedar City to 
his inquiry of EPIC, indicating that Mr. Calcaterra had a previous 
history of involvement in drugs offenses. 
15. The officer returned to the vehicle and continued the 
search of the trunk and found nothing of note in the trunk. 
16. The officer asked Mr. Calcaterra about the information 
that hefd received from the dispatcher relating to an alleged 
conviction involving the transportation of drugs. 
17. Mr. Calcaterra explained to the officer as he understood 
it, that he had been arrested, but the charges had been dismissed. 
18. The officer then asked if he could search the interior of 
the vehicle. 
19. Mr. Calcaterra indicated that he was not carrying any of 
the things that the officer was looking for. 
20. The officer then inquired a second time whether he could 
search the interior of the vehicle by saying "May I search the 
interior of the vehicle, then?" 
21. Mr. Calcaterra shrugged his shoulders, with a motion 
which the officer indicated on the witness stand. 
22. The officer took that to be consent and proceeded to 
search the vehicle. 
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23. Mr. Calcaterra did not object to the search of the 
vehicle at that time, nor did the passenger of the vehicle. 
24. The officer, in searching the vehicle, determined that 
there was a small quantity of marijuana and what appeared to be a 
marijuana pipe hidden in a plastic receptacle on the console 
portion of the vehicle. 
25. When Mr. Calcaterra determined that the drug had been 
found, he approached the officer and asked for a break. 
26. The officer then handcuffed Mr. Calcaterra and placed him 
under arrest. 
27. Mr. Dudley was likewise arrested and handcuffed when the 
second officer arrived. 
28. The officers then proceeded to complete the search of the 
vehicle and discovered other items of contraband while the 
defendants were standing by handcuffed and under arrest. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the decision of the officer to investigate the smell 
of marijuana was a level two detention, and the officer did have an 
articulable suspicion, based upon the smell of burned marijuana 
emanating from the vehicle. 
2. That the Court finds that there was consent to search the 
vehicle, and the officer was reasonable, under all the 
circumstances, in believing he had consent to search the trunk of 
the vehicle. 
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3. That the Court finds that the consent to search the trunk 
was voluntarily given. 
4. That the Court also finds that under the totality of the 
circumstances, the later shrugging of the shoulders was intended as 
consent to search the interior of Mr.Calcaterras vehicle, and the 
officer was justified in arriving at that conclusion. 
5. That the Court finds that the actions of the officer were 
reasonable, and the search was reasonable. 
6. That there is no reason to suppress the evidence, and the 
motion to suppress should be denied. 
day of mff, 1991. DATED this 
J. EHILIP EVES 
DISTRICT COURT 
' ^ - ^ ^ 
DGE 
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